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Abstract 
The Financial Institutions Act of 1992 provided a new legislative and regulatory framework 
for non-bank deposit-taking financial institutions (NBFIs), Building Societies and Credit 
Unions. The expectation of the Act was that the NBFIs would cater to the household sector of 
the economy and that the two types of NBFI would retain different balance sheet structures. 
However, the new regulation regime caused credit unions to change their lending policy to 
emphasis mortgage, rather than personal loans, and thus comerge to similar structure to 
building societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 1992, a new national system of prudential supervision of deposit taking Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFI), i.e. Building Societies and Credit Unions, was introduced after 
considerable official discussion following the failure of major building societies and credit 
unions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The enabling legislation was the Financial 
Institutions Act which provided a new basis for the registration and operation of Building 
Societies and Credit Unions. This legislation was co-operative federalism being based on the 
enactment of common state legislation which created a new national supervisory authority 
and new State supervisory authorities for the individual States. The legislation created 
detailed new prudential standards for all NBFI established under complementary legislation. 
The expected outcomes of the new legislation were that two distinct types of mutual deposit 
taking NBFIs, distinctive from banks, would serve different roles in the financial sector, 
would be readily identified by the structure of their balance sheets and would be able to 
operate successfully under the stringent new prudential standards which were derived from, 
and closely related to those applying to banks. NBFI were expected to cater for the 
requirements of the household and unincorporated enterprise sector in the economy. The two 
distinctive types of NBFI were Building Societies and Credit Unions. Building Societies 
were specialist mortgage finance lenders which could adopt either the mutual or propriety 
form of organisation. Credit Unions were required to be mutual organisations with a common 
bond of association requirement for membership and were expected to specialise in consumer 
finance. 
 
This new system remedied the deficiencies of the old State based system, provided new 
lending opportunities for the deposit taking NBFIs and expanded opportunities for inter-state 
trading. However, the adjustment of the deposit taking NBFIs to the new legislative order 
produced outcomes which were not fully foreseen and which constituted a substantial change 
to the deposit taking NBFIs. The adjustment was dictated by market forces and not by the 
requirement to observe black letter law.  
 
The responses by the NBFI differed: Building Societies changed corporate structure and 
many converted to banks; Credit Unions, unlike Building Societies, which are constrained by 
the legislation to remain as mutual societies prohibited from raising permanent tradable share 
capital have adapted by increasing substantially the amount of mortgage finance provided so 
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that their balance sheet structure has converged to that of building societies. The unexpected 
outcomes are that the Financial Institutions has lead to the substantial decline of the deposit 
taking NBFI sector and the rapid and almost complete convergence of building societies and 
credit unions. This economic analysis of particular legal rules, in this case, legislative rules, 
shows that economic incentives dominate black letter law and allows some suggestions as to 
changes to the legislative arrangements applying deposit taking NBFIs. Regulation of NBFI 
was transferred to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority following implementation 
of the Wallis Committee reforms. 
 
 
REASONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT 
 
Prior to 1992, building societies and credit unions were chartered under State legislation and 
were supervised under prescriptive systems by State agencies. During the 1970s, building 
societies had shown instability being particularly vulnerable to runs as there was a severe 
maturity mismatch on their balance sheets1. In 1987, the Western Australian Teachers Credit 
Union, the largest in the State, was taken over by the then Rural and Industries Bank. The 
failure of this credit union was described as the result of “an overstretched capital base and 
poor credit control”.2  
 
Concern about the stability of the NBFI sector came to a head in early 1990 with the run on 
the Pyramid Building Society, one of three in the Farrow group. Although over $200 million 
was withdrawn from the Pyramid Building Society in one week in February 1990, Victoria 
officials and Ministers made what turned out to be inaccurate and ill-advised statements of 
support for Pyramid Building Society.3 The Registrar of Building Societies issued a public 
statement on 12 February 1990 which stated in part: 
 
“In relation to Pyramid Building Society, the Registrar noted that Pyramid currently 
has liquid assets in excess of $400 million. Building Societies are required to lodge 
detailed monthly financial reports with the Registrar. These show that the Society has 
                                                          
1 An account of the problems permanent building societies faced in the 1970s is given by T G Beale, Financial 
Instability and the Queensland Building Societies”, Economic Analysis and Policy, 7, 1984. 
2 An accessible case study of this failure is given in Bruce Felmingham and William Coleman, Money and 
Finance in the Australian Economy, Sydney, Irwin, 1995, p423 
3 Details of the collapse are taken from D.J. Habersberger, Farrow Group Inquiry Final Report, Melbourne, 
Government Printer, 1994 
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adequate asset backing and is responsibly managed. Ongoing monitoring of the 
Society has revealed nothing of concern.” 
 
On 28 March 1990, the press release accompanying the audited accounts for the Farrow 
Corporation stated that the auditors had ‘confirmed Pyramid had liquid funds in excess of 12 
per cent. They also said Pyramid had complied fully with major requirements of the Building 
Society Act and that its policy of having liquid funds in excess of the Government’s 
Regulated level had proved prudent in the current environment.’ On 22 June 1990, the three 
building societies in the Farrow group, Pyramid, Geelong Building Society and Countrywide 
Building Society closed permanently with the appointment of an Administrator. In August 
1990, the deficiency in the estimated realisable assets of the Farrow group was $252 million. 
This estimate increased to $455 million in September 1990 while the total losses of the 
Farrow group were estimated in June 1993 to be $1033 million. The collapse of the Farrow 
group raised concern in a number of areas. The first was the contagion effects as depositors in 
other building societies in all States withdrew funds. The capital position of the Farrow group 
was revealed to be much more inadequate than the accounts might suggest. In order to 
increase the capital base to meet the requirement of 2.5 per cent of assets as required by the 
Building Societies Act, the Farrow building societies, in 1986, created three classes of shares: 
1. Permanent Shares 
2. Borrowing Shares 
3. Investing Shares 
 
Investing Shares comprised four distinct types of shares: 
1. Indefinite term Investing Shares 
2. Fixed term fully paid Investing Shares 
3. Fixed term contributing Investing Shares 
4. Non-withdrawable Investing Shares 
 
The characteristics of Investing Shares were unlike those typically associated with ordinary 
shares; owners of Investing Shares were not eligible to receive dividends and received only 
interest and were able to exercise only one vote per share holding not one vote per share. 
Non-withdrawable Investing Shares were actively marketed to investors as if they were 
deposits although they ranked behind deposits in the event of the winding up of the society. 
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Non-withdrawable Investing Shares were the major component of capital for the Farrow 
Building Societies as is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Capital Ratios of Farrow Group of Building Societies; Type of Capital as a Percentage of 
Total Assets - December 1989 
Building Society Permanent 
Capital 
Reserves Non-
withdrawable 
Share Capital 
Total Capital 
Pyramid 0.11 0.31 5.34 5.76 
Geelong 0.92 0.40 5.50 6.82 
Countrywide 0.63 0.33 4.80 5.76 
Federation 0.60 0.39 4.10 5.09 
 
In the event of the failure of the Farrow Building Societies, investors holding Non-
withdrawable Investing Shares lost all their funds. Use of Non-withdrawable Investing 
Shares had allowed the Farrow building societies to meet the new capital requirements while 
allowing the holders of permanent shares to maintain control of the societies without any 
marked dilution of control. 
 
 
THE NEW SYSTEM OF SUPERVISION 
 
In 1990, a Committee of Inquiry was established in Queensland to examine the role of non-
bank financial institutions in Queensland and this Committee recommended supervision by 
an organisation at arms length from government, based on the Reserve Bank system, with co-
operation between States4.  
 
The basis of the recommendations of the Brady Committee were State based NBFI perform a 
genuine role in the process of financial intermediation; this role focuses on the borrowing and 
lending needs of the financial sector5. The fundamental principle of prudential supervision 
was that responsibility of each NBFI lies with the owners and managers while the 
responsibility of the supervisor is to protect the interests of depositors and to ensure that they 
do not bear any uncontracted risk. Supervision is not concerned with the success or survival 
of individual NBFI or of the industry as these matters are determined by competition in the 
market6. The Farrow building societies case is a good illustration of depositors bearing 
                                                          
4 Brady Committee Report, Report of the Independent Committee of Inquiry into Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions and Related Financial Institutions and Related Financial Processes in the State of Queensland, 
Government Printer, Brisbane, 1990 
5 Brady Comittee Report, p76 
6 Brady Committee Report, p81 
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uncontracted risk. Depositors were sold non-withdrawable investing shares which possessed 
a higher risk than deposits but were lead to believe that two financial claims were, in practice, 
identical. 
 
Subsequently, a meeting of State Premiers in late 1990 established Heads of Agreement for 
national supervision of NBFI and these were put into effect by the common and uniform 
legislation passed by all States in 19927. The new system of supervision had a two-tier 
structure: at the apex is the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC) which 
determined national prudential standards while each State had a State Supervisory Authority 
(SSA) which was responsible for the on-ground supervision of NBFI. The prudential 
standards were comprised of a capital adequacy requirement which was very similar to the 
BIS standard adopted by the Reserve Bank for banks; liquidity requirements similar to the 
PAR and supported by industry provided liquidity schemes. The system differed initially 
from the Reserve Bank supervision of banks in providing for on site inspections of NBFI 
although the Reserve Bank since the Martin Committee Report8 was implemented on-site 
inspections of banks. In general, the prudential regulations are more stringent than for banks. 
 
As many institutions initially would have not been able to meet the capital adequacy 
requirements a two year period to provide for transitional arrangements was allowed. For 
example, at 30 June 1993, 14 credit unions had not meet the capital requirements.   
Unlike the Reserve Bank's supervision of banks, which does not place a charge on banks, the 
costs of the NBFI supervision scheme are fully met from an annual levy on NBFI.9 This levy 
has, at times, been a bone of contention amongst NBFI10, and continues as a matter of 
concern as the asset base of the NBFI under AFIC supervision diminishes. Deposit-taking 
non-bank financial institutions are now constituted under the Financial Institutions Act which 
requires minimum capital standards. The FI Act distinguishes between building societies and 
credit unions; financial institutions must operate as one or the other and can not operate as 
both. The Act further provides for "primary objects" which serve to define building societies 
                                                          
7 An account of the background to the new legislation is given by Mark Gray, ”Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
Reform”, in B. Gilligan, R. Lim and K. Lovegrove (eds), Managing Micro-Economic Reform, Federalism 
Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993. 
8 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, A Pocket Full of 
Change, Canberra, 1991. 
9 These charges have not yet been fully meet out of current income as in some States the levies are met from 
balances in statutory contingency funds. 
10 M.H.Waterhouse, Credit Unions and the Financial Institutions Scheme, Volume 1, Sydney, Credit Union 
Services Corporation, 1994, maintains that there is “some doubt whether AFIC’s Adminstration levy is fully 
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and credit unions. The building societies' primary object is that at least 50 per cent of their 
loans must be for the purchase of residential development while credit unions rules must 
contain a clause limiting membership to persons having a common body of association and 
not less than 60 per cent of its loans are to members. Capital adequacy requirements are that 
each society must maintain at all times a minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets of 
eight per cent; capital is decomposed into two tiers. Tier 1 is the highest quality capital and 
consists of general reserves and retained earnings; and for building societies only fully paid 
permanent share capital, partly paid permanent share capital and non-repayable share 
premium account. Tier 2 or supplementary capital comprises general provisions for doubtful 
debts, asset revaluation reserves, minority interests in subsidiaries, perpetual subordinated 
debt and term subordinated debt; and for building societies only mandatory convertible notes 
and similar capital instruments, limited life redeemable preference shares and hybrid capital 
instruments; and for credit unions only restricted -withdrawal membership shares. Tier 1 
must constitute 50 per cent of the capital requirements for building societies and 75 per cent 
for credit unions11. Liquidity standards are that each society must maintain at all times a 
minimum proportion of its balance sheet in specified liquid assets, PLA, where the base is 
total liabilities excluding capital. Assets eligible for inclusion as PLA include treasury notes, 
other Commonwealth Government securities, bank deposits and bank accepted and endorsed 
bills, State of Territory Government issued or guaranteed securities; and deposits with special 
service providers. Building societies must maintain a minimum PLA ratio of 10 per cent and 
an operational ratio of 10 per cent12 while credit unions have to maintain a minimum ratio of 
7 per cent and an operational ratio of 8 per cent13. 
 
 
NBFI RESPONSE TO THE NEW PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS 
 
The new prudential regulations created two problems for NBFI. The first was the need to 
raise more capital to meet the newly imposed capital adequacy requirements. The traditional 
means of raising capital from retained profits is not a suitable medium to provide for a 
sudden increase in capital. The second problem is to maintain profit margins when market 
conditions are moving adversely against NBFI. These pressures are accentuated by the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
equitable” and argues that “Competitive neutrality would be best achieved by treating the supervision of credit 
unions and building societies as a ‘public good’. 
11 Prudential Notes 3.2 and 4.2, Queensland Government Gazette, No. 45, pp766-767. 
12 Prudential Note 3.1 (Building Societies), Queensland Government Gazette, No. 45, pp779-805.   
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that the new prudential regulations impose increased liquidity requirements as well. In more 
general terms, the problem of the new capital adequacy requirements for mutual societies can 
be explained in the following way. 
 
NBFI have a balance sheet of the following form. 
 
Stylised NBFI Balance Sheet   
Liabilities:  Assets: 
Deposits D Prime Liquid Assets (PLA) PLA 
Capital C Loans L 
 
Risk Weighted Assets, RWA = ∑(rwi.Ai) 
  i=1...n 
 
where  
rw = risk weighting factor 
Total Income, Yt , for a mutual society is Gross Margin, GM, plus interest on required liquid 
reserves, Ypla , plus other income, Yo. 
The gross margins of NBFI, GM, is given by the difference between rates of interest charged 
on loans, Rl, and rates of interest paid on deposits, Rd, so that 
 
Gross Margin: GM = [Rl [(1-LR)D+C]- Rd.D] + Rpla.LR.D + Yo 
 
where  
LR = Liquidity Requirement (Prime Liquid Assets) 
Rpla  = rate of interest on Prime Liquid Assets 
and  
D = Deposits 
The NBFI net margin, NM, is the gross margin less expenses so that 
Net Margin or retained profits, RP =   [Rl [(1-LR)D+C]- Rd.D] + Rpla.LR.D + Yo 
where         
Ex = NBFI expenses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Prudential Note 4.1 (Credit Unions), Queensland Government Gazette, No. 45, pp859-861 
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Loan interest rates and deposit rates are, for the point of view of NBFI, market determined so 
that  
Rl =  f1( Bl, e) 
and          
Rd =  f2( Bd, f) 
where 
Bl =  Banks' loan rates 
Bd =  Banks' deposit rates 
and  
e, f represent other factors; the more important being the risk differential between banks and 
NBFI. The NBFI expected that the new supervision standards would improve the market 
perception of the risk attaching to NBFI allowing them to raise funds at a lower rate. It would 
be expected that NBFI would pay higher deposit rates and charge higher loan rates as 
compared to banks so that 
 
Rd   > Bd   
 and  
Rl   > Bl 
 
The new capital adequacy requirements constrain the size of NBFI according to the following 
formula: 
Risk Weighted Assets, RWA, = (1/CR)*RP = ∑(rwi.Ai) 
  i=1...n 
 
where  
CR = capital adequacy requirement 
The expansion of NBFI assets is given by the expression: 
∆ RWA = (1/CR). ∆RP 
where  
∆ RWA = increase in risk weighted assets 
and 
∆ RP  = Increase in Retained Profits 
NBFI are faced with two constraints: a capital and a liquidity constraint. The effect of the 
new supervisory standards depend on which constraint is effective and on what form the 
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constraint takes. The capital constraint is the one which is restrictive. What form the 
constraint takes depends on the type of NBFI. For building societies, the effective constraint 
is the Tier 1 requirement which requires building societies to maintain a minimum of four per 
cent of risk-weighted assets as Tier 1 capital (total capital adequacy requirements can be met 
by subordinated debt. On the other hand, the credit unions face the more stringent 
requirement to hold a minimum of six per cent of risk-weighted assets as Tier 1 capital; the 
requirement may be more stringent as credit unions must provide all capital from retained 
profits. If this is so, then for building societies, their expansion is limited by 
 
∆ RWA = (25).{∆ [Rl (0.8)D +C - Rd.D] + Rpla.0.2D + Yo - Ex} 
 
For credit unions, the constraint can be expressed as 
 
∆ RWA = (12.5). {∆ [Rl (0.85)D + C - Rd.D] + Rpla.0.15D + Yo - Ex} 
 
The most favourable circumstance for credit unions is given by 
 
∆ RWA = (16.7). {∆ [Rl (0.85)D + C - Rd.D] + Rpla.0.15D + Yo - Ex} 
 
The immediate responses to the imposition of the new supervisory requirements are: 
1. de-mutualise and issue share capital tradable on the Australian Stock Exchange or on an 
exempt market; 
2. raise Tier 2 capital by issuing subordinated debt;  
3. change their lending policy to reduce the risk-weighting of assets; 
4. reduce expenses; and 
5. merge; 
6. convert to another form of financial institution. 
 
 
An overall view of the change in the NBFI industry is given by the Chart below: 
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The decline in building society assets resulted from conversion of building societies to banks. 
One large building society, St George, converted to bank status in July 1992 and did not 
come under the new scheme while the Co-operative Building Society from South Australia, 
converted to the Adelaide Bank from the beginning of 1994. A further loss occurred from 
July 1995 when the Bendigo Building Society became a bank. In 1996, when the Queensland 
government announced a merger of its financial conglomerate Suncorp with Metway Bank, 
Suncorp Building Society was removed from the NBFI industry14.  St George Bank Ltd gave 
the following reasons for declaring its conversion from a Building Society was successful:  
1. higher earnings on its liquid assets,  
2. more diversity in its wholesale funding and  
3. greater access to international markets15.  
 
In addition, conversion is an attractive option as it results in lower compliance costs and 
greater opportunities to trade inter-state. Three building societies in Queensland, the Rock, 
Northern, and Ipswich and West Moreton have converted to company status and listed 
                                                          
14 Suncorp Building Society Ltd is the largest building society in Australia now comprising over 20 per cent of 
total industry assets and has an anomalous status as the only government owned building society in Australia. 
While ownership by any one interest of a building society is restricted by the FI Act to 10 per cent, there are 
exemptions to this requirement. Exemptions are provided under Prudential Note 3.4 (Building Societies) 
especially Prudential Standards, Ownership and Control, 3.4.2 Concentration of Ownership, Queensland 
Government Gazette, No. 45, pp833-834 
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successfully on the ASX. Two other Queensland building societies, Wide Bay and Mackay, 
converted to company status and issued permanent shares which trade on an exempt market. 
Other building societies, one example from Queensland, Heritage Building Society, have 
increased its Tier 2 capital by issuing subordinated debt. 
 
The problem for credit unions in responding to the capital requirements was that they were 
constrained in their ability to provide capital from retained earnings. We assume that loan 
rates and deposit rates, Rl and Rd, are exogenously determined to credit unions and that they 
essentially follow the lead of banks in changing these rates. Other sources of income such as 
interest earnings from liquid asset holdings, Ypla, and other income, Yo , are unlikely to be 
significant. Substantial increases in Ypla are unlikely in a low interest rate environment while 
credit unions have generally tried to absorb those fees which banks would pass on to 
depositors or borrowers. Credit unions have held an advantage over competing financial 
institutions in having a lower expense structure. In part, this lower structure was due to either 
implicit or explicit subsidies provided by the organisations which gave the common bond of 
association to credit union members such as employers or trade unions. In further part, this 
advantage derived from the more restricted range of financial activities offered by credit 
unions. In still further part, the advantage was a result of volunteer membership of credit 
union Boards and committees. 
 
In 1996/7, credit unions became subject to taxation at a transitional rate and paid tax at the 
full rate in the following year, 1997/8. While some of this expense advantage will remain 
with credit unions, it seems unlikely that credit unions will be able to make a significant 
reduction in expenses particularly if they continue to provide a full range of financial 
activities for, and introduce new services to, their members. The effects of cost pressures on 
credit unions are shown by their performance in relation to operating profit before tax. 
While total assets of major credit unions increased by 13 per cent in 1995, a similar rate to 
the previous year, the increase in operating profit before tax increased by only 0.12 per cent 
as compared with a profit increase of 20 per cent in 1994. During 1995, the cost-to-income 
ratio increased from 75.2 per cent to 76.4 per cent.16 Interest rate margins,as shown, below 
have shrunk.  
 
Interest rate margins, NBFI, Australia, 1995 and 2001  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15 Australian Financial Review, 24 November 1993 
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 June 1995 March 2001 
Credit Unions 6.0 4.8 
Building Societies 3.7 2.8 
APRA 2001 
 
Credit unions have improved their capital adequacy position without having to raise more 
capital by increasing their lending for owner occupied housing. The following stylised 
balance sheet shows how this can be done. 
 
Hypothetical Balance Sheet of a Credit Union 
Liabilities:  Assets:  RWA: 
Deposits 94 Cash and Liquids 15 0 
Capital 6 Owner Occupied 
Housing Loans 
10 5 
  Other Loans 75 75 
Total 100 Total 100 80 
 
Capital adequacy requirement is 6.4 (.08 of 80); giving a short fall of 0.4 or 6.25%. 
 
Increasing the proportion of owner occupied housing loans will change the balance in the 
following way: 
 
Hypothetical Balance Sheet of a Credit Union After Change in Lending Policy 
Liabilities:  Assets:  RWA: 
Deposits 94 Cash and Liquids 15 0 
Capital 6 Owner Occupied 
Housing Loans 
20 5 
  Other Loans 65 65 
Total 100 Total 100 70 
Capital adequacy requirement is 5.6 (.08 of 70) and the credit union now meets the 
requirement without raising more capital. Since 1988, the proportion of owner occupied 
housing loans in credit unions' books has steadily. This is shown in the Chart below: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 KPMG 1996 Financial Institutions Performance Survey, p35 
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Credit union lending for residential purposes has increased from 20 per cent of total assets in 
1992 to over 50 per cent in 2003 and has converged to a similar proportion of building 
societies assets. 
 
In consequence, personal loans, once the back bone of the credit union industry, has fallen 
substantially as a proportion of total assets as shown in the Chart below: 
Building Societies and Crediit Unions Personal Lending, Australia, 1992-2003
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Personal lending by credit unions accounts for only 20 per cent of total assets on 2003 
although it remains higher than in building societies. The relative fall in credit unions 
personal loans reflects, in part, their attempts to reduce bad debts in the area (and thus 
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maintain retained profits) and to counter the increased competition from finance companies 
in the area of loans to consumers for motor vehicles. Finance companies, using sophisticated 
credit scoring models, can approve loans quickly and with a minimum of documentation. 
Credit union procedures for personal loan applications and approvals remain cumbersome; 
typically approval is delayed by need to refer to a credit committee rather than the lending 
officer. The pressure on credit union margins will continue to intensify as other financial 
institutions move into the personal loan market. The banks can be expected to attempt further 
penetration of the home loan market and in doing so create new mortgage based loans which 
allow loans for furniture, swimming pools, cars and even holidays to be bundled together 
with a housing loan. Recent changes to credit card pricing and interest rate structure have 
made credit card finance competitive with personal loans for some purposes, especially for 
small loans. However, the banks themselves are under pressure from the nonbank mortgage 
originators. Building societies have already shown that they wish to shorten the maturity of 
their portfolio by moving into consumer loans and can be expected to continue to make 
inroads in this market. Other financiers can employ the new financial techniques available to 
improve their products in opposition to credit union personal loans. An example previously 
cited is the strong resurgence of finance companies in the motor vehicle financing arena. It 
would thus seem a reasonable prediction to make that the scope for credit unions to improve 
capital adequacy by changes in the portfolio towards greater concentration of mortgage loans 
will be limited. If this proves to be so, credit unions will come up against the very real 
problem of having to raise new capital or remained constrained in their growth by the 
expansion of retained profits. 
 
 
EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT 
 
The Financial Institutions Act was based on the premise that there was a real role for building 
societies and credit unions in meeting the financial needs of the household sector. The 
Financial Institutions Act removed many of the overly-prescriptive regulations on these 
institutions and provided a new structure which removed many of the implicit risks facing 
depositors. However, the Financial Institutions Act is highly prescriptive as to the structure of 
societies in that it prescribes that societies have a prime objects clause which attempts to 
impose a particular balance sheet structure on the two classes of societies. In addition, as the 
Financial Institutions legislation specifically prohibits credit unions from issuing permanent 
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tradable share capital, the Act provides no avenue for credit unions to obtain capital for 
expansion. Credit Unions have responded to this difficulty by changing their lending policy 
to make more loans on mortgage. In doing so, they have converged towards the structure of 
building societies so that many credit unions would meet the legislative requirements to be 
building societies.  
 
The outcomes of the operation of the Financial Institutions Act have been: 
1. a reduction in the size of the NBFI sector; 
2. a substantial exodus from the building society industry; 
3. a convergence of building societies and credit unions in balance sheet structure; and 
4. potential difficulty for funding the prudential supervision as the asset base of the industry 
has not grown. 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF NBFI 
 
At this juncture, the effects of the economic forces which have led to the outcomes 
considered above appear set to continue. The important market pressures affecting the 
position of NBFI are: 
 
1. Competition in loan markets; 
2. Increase in expenses for NBFI; 
3. Change in the Cheques and Payments Orders Act; 
4. Removal of restrictions on holding accounts with NBFI; 
5. Taxation; and 
6. Closure of bank branches. 
 
Competition in the markets for loans to the household sector is likely to intensify as banks 
shift their effort to personal loans in response to the pressure from the non-bank mortgage 
originators and adopt credit scoring models to approve loans. The prospect for NBFI is that 
their margins will continue to be squeezed.  
 
The increase in bank fees has lead to a shift of customers away from banks to NBFI which 
have absorbed government charges and which have been loath to charge explicit fees. To the 
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extent that these customers have high transaction, low balance accounts, NBFI may 
experience a net increase in expenses. Some NBFI have indicated their intention to charge 
transaction fees which limits their attractiveness to depositors. As has been discussed, credit 
unions are now subject to taxation which impacts on their net margin. Nevertheless there are 
some positive signs for NBFI. The Cheques and Payments Orders Act has been amended to 
allow building societies and credit unions to issue cheques in their own right rather than 
through the agency with a bank. The NSW government removed restrictions on government 
departments and authorities on holding accounts with building societies and credit unions. 
The closure of bank branches in country towns, particularly in New South Wales and 
Queensland has created an opportunity for NBFI to expand. 
 
Summary of Market Pressures on NBFI 
 Building Societies   Credit Unions  
Rates of interest charged 
on loans, Rl 
- - 
Rates of interest paid on 
deposits, Rd 
0 0 
NBFI expenses Ex 0 + 
NBFI fee income Yo + + 
 
Note:  
- indicates a possible decrease 
0  indicates no change 
+  indicates a possible increase 
 
 
ALTERNATIVES FOR NBFI 
 
A Generic NBFI 
 
One possible policy change in the regulation of NBFI would be to provide for one class of 
NBFI, a generic NBFI, which had to met prudential standards similar to those of banks. It 
would be consistent with the implied intentions of the legislation to leave it to individual 
NBFI to determine what they call themselves and to the market to judge if this is credible. 
This is, of course, the position in regard to banks. While the banking legislation regulates 
banks it allows a variety of types of banks to operate under a common set of prudential 
standards. Clearly, credit unions are placed in a particularly restrictive position in having to 
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meet capital adequacy requirements with 75 per cent in Tier 1 unlike both building societies 
and banks which have to maintain a minimum of 50 per cent in Tier 1 capital17. 
 
Mutual Societies and Risks 
 
It may be argued that the different capital requirements are necessary to take account of the 
difference in risks borne by depositors in mutual societies. credit unions. However, in both 
formal and actual terms, the role of a depositor in a mutual society is quite different to a 
depositor in a propriety company. In a mutual society, a depositor is a member of the society, 
has voting rights, and is entitled to share in the profits of the society; hence, the role of 
depositor and equity participant is blurred. A depositor in a propriety company, such as one 
of the banks or a building society listed on the Stock Exchange, has no right to participate in 
the profit of the company. If anything, a depositor in a mutual society bears, and should bear, 
a greater degree of risk than a depositor in a propriety company and, hence, mutual societies 
should have a lesser prudential standard than a proprietary company rather than a greater. 
 
New Forms of Capital for Mutual Societies 
 
If it is thought necessary to require credit unions to be mutual societies, it is possible to 
devise new forms of capital which can preserve the organisational status of credit unions but 
allow them to raise permanent capital. If this new capital were tradable capital, issues of 
capital by credit unions would create a new market test of the performance of credit union 
management. Under the prudential standards which impose capital adequacy requirements, 
the role of capital is seen as providing a buffer for losses to protect the interests of depositors 
at the expense of equity holders. 
 
One requirement for capital to meet capital adequacy requirements is that it be permanently 
available for this role. One such type of capital which would meet these criteria is the type 
proposed by the Building Societies Commission for UK building societies. This form of 
capital is referred to as permanent interest bearing shares, PIBS, and has the following 
characteristics: 
a. it will be permanent; 
b. it will be interest bearing, not profit related; 
                                                          
17 This has been argued by Kevin Davis,” Prudential Regulation and Australian Credit Unions”, Australian 
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c. interest can be waived, if the society's capital position requires it; 
d. it can be written down to absorb losses without triggering a winding up of the society; and 
e. on winding up a society, holders of PIBS rank behind not only ordinary creditors, 
including depositors, but also holders of withdrawable share capital and subordinated 
debt.  
 
In this form, PIBS is analogous to non-redeemable preference shares issued by joint stock 
companies and hence would be permanent. There is no need to insist that this capital is non-
marketable; indeed, there is every reason to insist that PIBS is tradable capital. Trading PIBS 
in an exempt market such as some non-listed Building Societies have for their capital issues 
would provide a welcome market test, which is now conspicuously absent, for a credit union. 
The rate of return on PIBS has to be interest related not profit related. Two approaches to 
pricing PIBS recommend themselves. The first is to set the rate of interest payable on PIBS 
as a rate equivalent a market benchmark rate plus a margin. Candidates for the benchmark 
rates would be leading market rates such as the long term bond rate or the 90 day BAB rate. 
The alternative candidate for the benchmark rate is a credit union deposit rate such as the rate 
on a term deposit of a given maturity. The choice between rates depends on whether the 
reference point for the test of credit union management is the general market or the 
performance of the credit union itself. A benchmark rate of the long term bond rate would 
require the credit union to produce returns equivalent to those available in financial markets 
while a credit union benchmark rate would place pressure on credit union management to 
produce returns comparable with those paid to depositors. If our previous assumption about 
credit union rates being closely determined by market rates is a correct representation of the 
actual position then the choice is largely immaterial and may be made on marketing grounds. 
The choice of the margin would be determined by the risk premium appropriate to PIBS and 
would be determined reference to actual market considerations at the time of issue. In a 
mature market for PIBS, one would expect a wide variety of issues with different benchmark 
rates and margins with their price reflecting the current market rate of return. PIBS would be 
issued to members of the credit union so that holders of PIBS would hold voting rights and 
could use those votes to influence membership of the Board and of credit union policy. It 
would be important to ensure that PIBS were tradable in a secondary market which would 
allow holders liquidity without affecting the liquidity of the credit union itself. It could be 
expected that there would be a market for PIBS; there is, in general, a market for financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal of Management, 19,1 1994. 
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instruments paying a high and reliable return among retired investors. While it can be argued 
that PIBS are not risk free, the counter arguments are that they would be priced to reflect this 
risk and that they would be actually less risky than other financial assets which have attracted 
substantial funds from retired investors. Obvious examples are unlisted property and other 
trusts. Regulators would be expected to insist that there be some limit on the amount of PIBS 
issued. However this is unnecessary as long as PIBS are marketable (and there is unlikely to 
be a demand for them if they are unmarketable) because the risk attaching to PIBS in the eyes 
of investors will increase as the proportion of PIBS in total capital of the credit union 
increases. This is because in the event, however remote, of winding up the credit union, 
holders of PIBS have little by way of a buffer from losing their capital in whole or in part. 
The major argument against this proposal is the one derived from the Farrow case. PIBS 
could be sold to depositors who are unaware, or ,of more concern, who have been mislead 
about the status of such shares and who are required to bear uncontracted risk. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The introduction of new legislation for State based deposit taking NBFI lead to unexpected 
outcomes. Both credit unions and building societies have adjusted their lending policy to 
meet the imperatives of the new legislation but in doing so have moved away from the role 
envisaged by the legislation. Credit unions have been able to adjust to the new prudential 
requirements by changing their lending policies but, in doing so, are moving away from their 
traditional base; moreover such adjustments cannot continue for ever. Also as a result of the 
adjustment, credit unions are beginning to converge in lending policy and balance sheet 
structure with building societies. These developments are driven by economic factors and not 
by black-letter law as confirmed by the change in regulation of NBFI following the Wallis 
report recommendations. 
 
If NBFI are worth keeping as an important financial institution in the household sector, 
changes to their legislation are worth considering. These changes are:  
(1) the creation of a new category of NBFI, the generic NBFI, which has no primary objects 
clause; 
(2) allowing credit unions to issue new forms of capital which jointly meet the objectives of 
prudential supervision and the needs of the societies; and 
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(3) relaxing the capital adequacy and liquidity requirements for mutual societies. 
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